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Abstract
This paper provides details of the context and background to UK policies for CCS, and critically examines the national strategy
and detailed initiatives to date. Interviews with key players inform the analysis. Climate and energy security goals are first set
out, and arguments about the place of coal within them discussed. Then the paper turns to the evolution of the debate about CCS
in UK policy circles, and rationales for public support. Lastly the paper analyses some of the political, economic and technical
issues that have emerged as CCS became more prominent in UK energy strategies.
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1. Introduction
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies have recently risen to prominence in UK energy policy debates. The
technologies were repeatedly dismissed as impractical or costly for many years, but the rationales for policy support
have strengthened. CCS technologies are now seen as a critical element of the UK’s response to the twin challenges
of climate change and energy security. Support for CCS is shaped and driven by national policy concerns, and has
also been influenced by the government’s position in international climate change diplomacy. Part of this transition
in the fortunes of CCS is due to a greater awareness of CCS technologies and some progress in their development.
But, as these drivers imply, the political context and understanding of the social problems to which policy should
respond have changed radically too. These now favour CCS technologies, which offer significant greenhouse gas
emissions whilst allowing the continued use of fossil fuels.
Despite these shifts, the policy landscape is still rapidly evolving, and concrete actions to support CCS have become
the subject of intense debate within government, in the press and among stakeholders. Forthcoming regulatory and
financing decisions at the EU and UK levels make it difficult to reach conclusive judgements about the eventual
contribution that CCS technologies might make. This paper sets out to explore the evolving technological, economic
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and policy context for these decisions. It does so in the light of the views of key stakeholders. The paper draws on
historical background information and details of current debates from major UK policy documents, academic
literature, grey literature and press articles. Background interviews with individuals representing 10 key
organisations (see acknowledgements at the end of this paper) were used to clarify the authors’ understanding of
current policy controversies around CCS, and stakeholders’ views on them.
2. The UK energy context and the role of coal
In common with many industrialised countries, the UK energy system remains dominated by fossil fuels. UK
primary energy supply in 2007 included natural gas (91mtoe), oil (84mtoe), coal (40mtoe), nuclear electricity
(14mtoe), and renewables (5mtoe) [1]. Electricity use accounts for 18% of UK final energy consumption; direct uses
of oil and gas (e.g. transport, space heating) account for 48% and 31% respectively [1]. Since 1970 there has been a
strong shift towards a greater share of natural gas relative to coal in UK primary energy supply, and the contribution
from renewables has remained limited. Coal use in electricity generation declined rapidly in the 1990s then
stabilised in the early 21
st
 century, and has recently increased due to higher gas prices and reduced availability of
ageing nuclear power stations. In 2007, sources of electricity generation in the UK included gas (43%), coal (35%),
nuclear (15%) and renewables (5%) [1]. The UK has large geological reserves of coal, but the cost of mining it is
high by international standards, and therefore economic reserves are actually quite small. Many deep coal pits have
been allowed to flood, and to re-open them would be very expensive.
UK energy policy priorities focus on four main areas: climate change mitigation, maintaining reliable energy
supplies, tackling fuel poverty (which describes households that spend a high proportion of their income on energy)
and the promotion of competitive markets. Whilst the fourth priority has been dominant since the privatisation and
deregulation of previously State-owned energy industries 20 years ago, policy has shifted significantly in recent
years to focus on the first two priorities [2].
Climate change has been a major focus from the early 2000s. UK emissions of CO2 fell by 7.4% between 1990 and
2000,but began to increase again in the early years of this decade. The 2007 Energy White Paper [2] set out the
policies through which the government is seeking to reduce carbon emissions by at least 60% by 2050 (from a 1990
base) – a target that has since been increased to an 80% reduction by 2050. However, critics argue that government
is not doing enough in areas such as energy efficiency and promoting renewables to achieve these ambitious
reductions, and that progress so far on CCS has been too slow. However there is now political agreement that
tackling climate change must be a very high policy priority, and the gap between targets and real progress may
change as a result of a new Climate Change Bill going through Parliament. Legally binding five-year national
‘carbon budgets’, set at least 15 years ahead, will chart the pathway to follow in more detail.
To date the UK’s claim to international leadership on climate mainly rests on its fortuitous fall in carbon emissions
in the 1990s due to the switch from coal to gas-fired power generation. This has been enhanced by government
efforts to promote this policy agenda through international diplomacy. However, with emissions rising again
recently, support for CCS is seen by the UK government as an important indication that they remain committed to
climate change mitigation. As such the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has become a significant player
in UK climate policy. This has started having consequences for the position of CCS technologies, since much of this
diplomacy is designed to engage rapidly developing countries such as China and India. As a result of this
perspective the FCO and the environment ministry (Defra) are said to be sensitive to suggestions that new coal-fired
plants could be built in the UK without speedy implementation of CCS. The creation of a new Department for
Climate Change and Energy in early October 2008, which takes energy and climate policy functions from Defra and
the business ministry (known as BERR), may help to resolve tensions around this and other policy priorities.
Chief amongst these other priorities is energy security. Much of the UK discussion of energy security focuses on a
perceived ‘electricity gap’ that is expected to arise if new generation capacity is not developed in the near future.
Whilst there are many plans by companies to build new gas-fired power plants in anticipation of plant closures,
alternatives to this such as nuclear power and coal are seen by government as necessary to limit future UK
dependence on imports, specifically imports of Russian gas. Whilst concerns about dependency on Russian gas
imports are understandable, it is also important to consider whether these are well founded. Projections by
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consultancy Oxera for the 2007 Energy White Paper show that the UK’s gas supplies are likely be sourced from a
variety of locations and through a range of transit routes [3]. In the period to 2020 this includes some continuation of
supplies from the UK continental shelf, piped gas from Norway, LNG imports from countries such as Qatar and
supplies from continental Europe via inter-connectors. Only the last of these includes Russian gas. By contrast, the
UK now imports more than twice as much coal as it produces, and 45% of its imports come from Russia [4]. It is
therefore arguable whether substituting gas fired electricity generation with coal contributes to energy security.
Until recently, energy security arguments were rarely made for the development of new coal-fired capacity – either
with or without CCS. However, in 2006 a Coal Forum was set up within the business ministry with a remit to ‘find
solutions to secure the long-term future of coal-fired power generation and UK coal production’ [5], and efforts to
promote CCS were stepped up. In 2008 the Energy Minister argued, ‘…given the geopolitics of energy insecurity in
future, diversity in terms of energy resource is absolutely vital. If we did not have coal it would bring forward an
extra dash for gas. We need to think of the national security implications of that’ [6]. That the UK government has
begun to use energy (and even national) security arguments to make the case for CCS is perhaps an indication of
serious commitment to ‘clean coal’ technology (Section 3), and also of how politically important and contentious
the issues around CCS became in 2008 (Section 4).
Whilst energy security and climate change mitigation drive the energy policy agenda, the way in which these goals
are pursued is shaped by an enduring commitment to competitive energy markets. Since privatisation in the late
1980s a key characteristic of energy policy has been to ‘sweat’ existing assets [7] such as power plants, transmission
lines and pipelines. After privatisation there was an initial unbundling of energy assets and a steady introduction of
competition, followed by consolidation. Six large multinational companies now dominate the market for electricity
and gas. This market structure bears directly on debates about CCS. For those who wish to see new, large-scale
technologies like CCS being deployed, consolidation means that market players are financially strong enough to
take the associated risks. On the other hand, in a liberalised market companies will invest wherever risks and returns
are most favourable, which in practice has meant a preference for further gas-fired generation. Significant new coal-
fired generation capacity is now proposed by companies, but this investment remains uncertain and controversial,
with much hanging on UK and EU policy on CCS (see Section 4), and on public acceptability.
3. UK innovation policy, ‘clean coal’ and CCS
Publicly funded energy research and development (R&D) in the UK declined sharply in the late 1980s and 1990s, as
a consequence of privatisation of the utility sector and national laboratory facilities. The UK government has
resisted becoming too involved in supporting specific low carbon technologies such as CCS. The standard argument
is that to do much more than support R&D would risk ‘picking winners’ [8]. This argument has been used by
ministers and civil servants for investment (e.g. for new power plants) and in supporting innovation (e.g. in
renewables). On the face of it the argument makes sense in the context of the liberalised energy markets that have
been established in many countries. Advocates of this view [e.g. 7] contend that governments should set frameworks
that emphasise outcomes of policy and should leave technology choice to private investors. However, despite its
immediate attractiveness, this general reluctance to pick winners – or at least to acknowledge that this takes place –
is flawed for a number of reasons. These include the need to set priorities if budgets are limited and the propensity
of market mechanisms to select the cheapest technologies (and hence, to provide less support for less well developed
technologies). Recently, increasing political attention to addressing urgent climate and energy security concerns has
highlighted the shortcomings of ‘not picking winners’ arguments. UK energy RD&D budgets have increased
significantly, and there has been more emphasis on a strategic approach to technology support.
UK support for cleaner fossil fuel technologies for power generation has a long history dating back to the 1970s. But
as in many other countries, support for CCS is relatively recent. For example, the government’s 1993 ‘Coal White
Paper’ [9] stated, ‘Unless the technical options for the removal and disposal of CO2 from power stations flue gases
become commercial reality (which seems unlikely), CO2 emissions pose substantial long term problems’ and
‘…indications are that this option would be very expensive and would have significant environmental implications
of its own.’ Once the coal industry had been privatised in 1994, government policy was to ‘stimulate the
development of clean coal technologies wherever they have prospects of being economically attractive and
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environmentally acceptable…’[10]. This stopped well short of supporting any substantial clean coal demonstration
programme, however, and this reluctance remained government policy for at least a decade thereafter.
In 1999 the government’s strategy became one of promoting ‘cleaner’ (rather than ‘clean’) coal. Improving the
efficiency of coal fired power generation to reduce CO2 emissions was first explicitly identified as a policy goal.
However the case against supporting large scale demonstrations of any clean coal technologies was remade.
Incremental improvements with modest government support were seen as more cost effective than supporting major
demonstrations of slightly more efficient technologies such as IGCC [11]. In a further review in 2001, the
Government concluded that there was still no case to support commissioning of new supercritical, ultra-supercritical
or IGCC plant in the UK [12]. This review suggested that a CCS plant would reduce carbon emissions at a cost of
£160-£170 per tonne of carbon avoided. This cost was considered prohibitive, but oil companies operating in the
North Sea had a potential interest in using CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) from partly depleted fields. The
review then recommended ‘assessing in a systematic way the legal, scientific, engineering and economic aspects of
both EOR and of geological CO2 capture and storage.’ [12]. By 2003, tackling climate change was centre stage in
UK energy policy, and there was a promise to ‘…set up an urgent detailed implementation plan… to establish what
needs to be done to get a [CCS] demonstration project off the ground…[using] funding from international
sources…’ [13]. The window of opportunity for EOR in the North Sea was short given depletion rates, but UK
funding for demonstration projects was clearly still not promised.
The business ministry duly reviewed the feasibility of CCS in 2003 [14], and now concluded that the costs ‘compare
favourably with other large scale abatement options’, but industry would not invest without ‘substantial additional
financial incentives’, even for EOR projects. A large-scale demonstration of CCS was now seen by the business
ministry as a real possibility and the ‘ultimate goal’ of work in this area. Its primary function would be to ‘showcase
UK technologies and capabilities’ to the world, with a view to capturing global markets for CCS technology.
However a further study on the commercial feasibility of EOR in 2004 [15] again found that it was not an attractive
proposition in the North Sea, but left the option on the table as a potentially lower-cost (and more legally acceptable)
means of demonstrating CCS.
The political case for support for CCS and for funding a demonstration plant came relatively recently. In 2005-06
the front runner for possible funding appeared to be BP and Scottish and Southern Energy’s proposal to convert an
existing gas-fired power station at Peterhead in Scotland to run on hydrogen. This would have been a large
demonstration (350 MW) of pre-combustion carbon capture technology, with CO2 sent through an existing pipe to
the Miller oil and gas field in the North Sea for EOR purposes. However in May 2007 BP announced that it was
closing the Miller field and transferring the project to Abu Dhabi, because the government had been too slow to
commit its support to the project. It appears that senior figures in government at the time felt they could not simply
‘pick a winner’ by backing BP’s scheme: if there was to be funding for a demonstration project there would have to
be an open competition for the funds. This competition was announced in autumn 2007 (see Section 4.2 below).
4. Key debates about CCS technologies in the UK
Four areas of current debate are highlighted in this section, based on interviews with key players and published
sources. These are: the legitimacy of CCS, the UK approach to full scale demonstrations of CCS technologies, the
issue of longer-term financial support, and a debate about ‘capture ready’ power stations. These debates are analysed
below. There are, of course, other important issues for CCS including who is responsible for long term liabilities,
and who should finance and build common pipeline infrastructure. However, these issues have been less prominent
in public debates so far.
4.1. Legitimacy of CCS
There is broad support for the UK’s focus on CCS. Many of those involved in developing CCS technologies feel
that progress has been too slow and the level of government support too low. However there is a significant
constituency that is sceptical of CCS, principally among the environmental NGOs. Greenpeace UK remain very
concerned about any support for CCS technologies as they consider public support should go to other, more
immediately effective means to cut greenhouse gas emissions. They are strongly opposed to any new coal-fired
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generation capacity in the UK, but have endorsed calls for an emissions limit on all generators that would allow new
coal provided CCS is used. One of the arguments put forward by Greenpeace is that CCS technologies risk
perpetuating the ‘lock-in’ of centralised energy systems [16]. Markusson and Haszeldine [17] note there is more
than one lock-in scenario to consider, depending both on the ‘capture readiness’ of new capacity (see discussion
below) and whether or not CCS actually becomes available later. The government argues that capture readiness will
help prevent carbon lock-in [18], but if CCS fails to deliver then the reverse may be more accurate (if the promise of
CCS is used to justify new coal fired capacity in the short term).
4.2. The UK demonstration and technology choice
Amongst proponents of CCS, there is an active debate about which particular technologies are the most desirable.
Many organisations maintain that all variants should be supported – and that it is too early to tell which (e.g. pre- or
post-combustion) will turn out to be the most technically and/or economically attractive. Some companies have
expressed clear preferences for pre- or post-combustion CCS technologies. Progressive Energy, BP and Centrica
have argued in favour of pre-combustion CCS, on ground such as lower cost, greater technical advancement and the
link between this technology, the production of hydrogen and a potential ‘hydrogen economy’. Its applicability to
gas-fired power generation is also relevant in the UK context. On the other hand, post-combustion CCS may be
easier to implement – and is more likely to be suitable for retrofit to hundreds of existing plants throughout the
world. Proponents of post-combustion CCS, such as Doosan Babcock, argue that in principle this could include
many of the new plants being constructed in China and India [19]. Furthermore, they argue that implementing pre-
combustion CCS on a coal-fired plant is more risky. The power plant technology (known as IGCC) that allows pre-
combustion CCS using coal is still at the demonstration stage [20].
As Section 3 has shown, the debate about full-scale demonstration of CCS was a long one. In November 2007 the
government provided more details about the competition [21] and confirmed that pre-combustion technologies were
excluded, to the dismay of the carbon Capture and Storage Association, which warned that many projects would
now be shelved. The UK demonstration should be coal-fired, with CO2 stored offshore. A ‘phased approach’ would
be acceptable, provided that the full chain of CCS technologies was demonstrated by 2014, and it should then
capture around 90% of the CO2 produced by the equivalent of 300MW generating capacity ‘as soon as possible
thereafter’. Critics note that the scale at which CCS is demonstrated in the UK by 2014 could be very small, and that
the phrase ‘as soon as possible thereafter’ for demonstration at 3-400MW scale does not necessarily bode well with
respect to the often stated aim of having CCS commercially available by 2020.
The decision to explicitly ‘pick a winner’ in the form of post-combustion CCS applied to coal-fired generation has
proven highly controversial. The stated rationale [21] is that this is ‘a technology that is relevant and transferable to
key global markets, particularly the big emerging economies.’ However critics have noted that if the aim was to
demonstrate the feasibility of CCS this could have been achieved much more quickly in the UK by opening the
competition to gas-fired power stations.
4.3. Financing CCS in the UK
In June 2008 four proposals were selected to go forward in the competition, including E.On’s controversial
Kingsnorth power station (see Section 4.4). It is not clear at this stage how much the demonstration will cost, and
what financing mechanism for public funding is on offer. For many, the ideal vehicle for funding the demonstration
and subsequent CCS plants would be the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). However, almost all proponents
of CCS agree that the EU ETS is not yet sufficient to finance CCS because carbon prices are not high or stable
enough. Therefore other options are required – at least in the short to medium term.
In designing alternative financing schemes, the government will need to take into account a range of factors, not
least the uncertainty about the eventual costs of CCS. This is compounded by the tendency of prospective
developers of large-scale new technologies such as CCS to under-estimate costs. This has been the case in the past
for nuclear power for example [22]. This ‘appraisal optimism’ is not random: supporters of new technology, besides
a natural enthusiasm, also face incentives that will systematically tend to produce low cost estimates. This
asymmetry of incentives arises because optimistic cost estimates will tend to help approval of public funding for
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projects. It is interesting to note therefore that the costs of CCS used in economic modelling for government policy
documents over the last 2-3 years has fallen. Between the 2006 Energy Review [5] and the 2007 White Paper [2],
estimated costs for fossil power plants with CCS fell by 24-36%. Whilst this may reflect greater knowledge about
these costs, it is hard to see what basis there is for this in the absence of full scale demonstrations.
There are ongoing discussions about the precise form government support should take. The main options include
upfront subsidies such as grants or tax breaks to developers, and performance incentives such as guarantees on the
electricity and/or carbon price CCS projects might receive. Whilst grants or tax breaks are usually used by
governments to fund R&D, there are questions about their appropriateness for supporting large scale
demonstrations. Private firms might argue that up front assistance through this route helps them to mitigate one of
the major risks they face – the uncertainty in capital cost estimates. A substantial capital grant would help capital-
intensive technologies like CCS to ‘fit better’ within the competitive market framework in which these firms
operate. However, the costs to government would be considerable – and would be concentrated in a short space of
time (the construction phase of the project).
The experience with up front grant support is mixed. Capital grants have been used in the UK to successfully
support some renewable energy technologies (e.g. offshore wind and solar PV) – though neither has been fully
commercialised. Capital subsidies have also been used to support the demonstration of large-scale ‘clean coal’
technologies in the United States. As would be expected for demonstration plants, availability levels were
significantly lower than those of commercial technologies [20]. However, a contributing factor might have been a
lack of incentive for the utilities to minimise capital costs and maximise their output by keeping designs as simple as
possible. Since they were technology demonstrations, there was also pressure from the US government that they
should include many novel features. These utilities would not have faced as much competition as utilities in the UK
electricity market of today – so any cost escalations could be passed through to consumers more easily.
An alternative approach to public funding would be to focus on performance incentives. This could arguably
encourage companies to minimise risks so that they can maximise their revenue – and, in the case of CCS, the
carbon emissions reductions. However, in a competitive market such as that in the UK this incentive might also be
present if capital subsidies are favoured. In both cases, the risk to government might be reduced if more than one
project were supported. This could provide some diversity in both CCS technology type and in the companies
involved in building and operating the plants. The current plan to finance only one plant means that the government
will not be able to hedge its bets in this way.
This performance-based approach underpins many of the interim financing mechanisms that are under consideration
within the EU [23]. Proposals include a ‘contract for differences’ whereby the difference between the ETS carbon
price and a level sufficient to fund investment would be paid by governments. Alternatively developers could be
awarded additional ETS credits for storing carbon, in addition to the benefit of avoiding having to buy allowances.
Another mechanism could be a simple payment per tonne of carbon stored. These arrangements could be financed
through recycling of revenues from the auctioning of allowances from 2013. The UK government has committed
itself to 100% auctioning, but is equally committed to resisting any hypothecation of taxation revenue. Auctioning
allowances would further favour gas generation relative to coal, given their different carbon intensities. A solution at
the EU level now appears necessary if more demonstration projects are to be financed.
4.4. Coal without CCS - the capture ready debate
In the meantime new coal fired generation capacity without CCS has become the most heated political issue. This
has centred on utility E.ON’s application for consent to build two 800MW supercritical coal fired generation units at
its site at Kingsnorth in South East England. These units are to replace sub-critical capacity to be retired by 2015.
Ministerial consent is required, and can be granted subject to conditions. It could therefore be a condition of consent
that a new plant should be ‘capture ready’ – i.e. that they could have CCS equipment added at a later date.
Kingsnorth would not be the first UK power station to have this requirement attached to its consent, but it would be
the first applied to a coal fired power station (the previous three have been for gas-fired stations). In a letter to the
Secretary of State [24], Greenpeace pointed out that this was the first application for a large coal fired power station
in the UK for 25 years, and called for there to be a public inquiry before consent was granted. Using Freedom of
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Information Act powers Greenpeace UK then obtained details of an email exchange between E.On and the civil
servant drawing up planning conditions. This appeared to show that the civil servant had withdrawn a suggestion to
include a condition about CCS after the utility objected to this. In the event E.On issued a press release announcing
that they would enter Kingsnorth into the CCS demonstration competition, but asking that the government delay
giving consent for its construction until after the government had consulted on its definition of ‘capture ready’ [25].
A consultation on CCS-related policies closed in September 2008 [18]. It focused on a range of technical questions
about the definition of ‘capture ready’ for both UK and EU policy. This definition includes four elements: the
provision of enough space for carbon capture equipment, the availability of appropriate storage sites, the availability
of a means of transporting CO2 to a storage site, and the feasibility of fitting carbon capture equipment to an existing
plant. It did not deal with wider questions about the extent to which any definition of ‘capture ready’ would be
sufficient in the absence of regulations mandating CCS beyond a certain date. Furthermore, the consultation
suggested that only the first element of its ‘capture ready’ definition (the provision of sufficient space for CCS
equipment) should be strictly applied. Sentiment among some stakeholders does not appear to strongly support the
concept of ‘capture ready’: some energy companies say they understand the regulatory risks and will make any new
capacity capture ready of their own accord. Other stakeholders see the concept as at best a distraction and at worst a
smokescreen to get unabated coal capacity built in advance of CCS being available. A number of organisations have
also voiced scepticism about the value of ‘capture ready’ conditions in the absence of further measures to limit the
emissions per kWh generation by all new power plants by a certain date (e.g. 2020). These include the House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee [6] and the government’s own environmental regulator – the
Environment Agency [26]. Given the widespread resistance to new unabated coal capacity it is unlikely that
resolving the regulatory definition of capture ready will significantly remove political obstacles to proposals such as
E.On’s.
5. Conclusions
In a short space of time, CCS has become a prominent option for reducing carbon emissions in both international
and UK policy debates. CCS is clearly no longer a marginal technology in the UK Government’s assessment, and
some clear actions have been promised to make it a reality. But, as in other countries, there appears to be some way
to go yet before the talk and promises translate into low carbon fossil fuel power stations in the UK. In short, CCS
now appears to be serious politics in the UK, but not yet serious business. To make CCS a reality, the UK
government appears to be relying heavily on its competition for funds to demonstrate CCS technology. As a result
of this and similar demonstrations in other countries, the government and industry are looking for economic and
technical uncertainties to be diminished significantly. As in other countries, support for CCS is associated with
multiple risks. It is difficult to improve confidence in CCS technologies until the first demonstrations are up and
running – in practice this is likely to take at least another 6 years. There are also uncertainties about the technical
performance and the eventual costs of CCS. It can be argued that the single track UK approach compounds these
risks because it is impossible to tell a priori which variant will work best.
If CCS is a serious option, then many feel that government will have to do more to reduce economic and financial
risks, and make it an attractive proposition for investors. Because the demonstration competition supports just one
technology applied at one power station, it may not be sufficient to create a large network of suppliers, service
providers and so on who are then eager for more business. However, if it is matched by other demonstrations in
other countries (which seems likely), this would have an effect on many of the multinational firms involved. The
main economic problem for CCS in the UK is that no financing arrangements are promised beyond those for the
demonstration plant. It may be some time before the carbon price in the EU ETS is high or certain enough for
investors to rely on it as a source of finance. Furthermore, even if this is the case, there are many other low carbon
investment options that are likely to be more attractive. To conclude, three major uncertainties will affect the fate of
CCS in the UK: EU-level decisions on funding further demonstration and deployment projects, UK politics around
new unabated coal fired electricity generation capacity, and the results of bringing energy and climate change
responsibilities together in a single ministry in 2008.
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